As has already been stated, Liz has a "honey-do" list as long as my leg, and one of them is organizing all my crap so we can finally empty the storage unit and save ourselves the cost every month. So, yesterday, we started going through all the old bins and boxes of my stuff. Some of the treasures contained within have already been scanned and posted on Facebook (thanks to Liz's obsession with that site), but I wanted to talk about another that I found.
Amidst all the letters, photos, mementos and knick-knacks were (literally) dozens of books I haven't seen in (literally) decades. One was a series of summaries on the military-political possibilities of conflict in the various regions of the world, written by James F. Dunnigan, a military historian and analyst for the Reagan White House in 1984.
This man touched on areas of conflict and tension across the globe, and having picked up the dusty tome, I thought it would be very nearly irrelevant in the light of the last 25 years of actual history. In fact, however, he was shockingly accurate.
His comments on Afghanistan, for example, obviously weren't 100% accurate. He made the argument that the Soviet-Afghan war had the potential to last decades, and seemed to think it would. The premise he based this on wasn't in error, though. He felt that the culture of the Afghani peoples made the effort that the Soviets were trying to accomplish so "long term" in scope that he failed to take into account the fact that the USSR would fail before the effort was abandoned, and not the other way around.
His analysis of the Iraqi threat to world peace also seems, on the surface, in err... but with a little deeper reading, we see he was actually spot on. He seemed a bit dismissive of the threat the '85 Iraqi regime posed to the rest of the world, but only because he recognized how insignificant the actual socio-political/military capacity of this rogue nation posed to anyone further away from the Iraqi frontier than 200 kilometers. He knew and understood the threat to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE that Iraq posed... but also saw that there was no functional ability to command the massive Iraqi military machine outside of ordering mass human-wave attacks on fortified and entrenched forces across the Iranian border. He also recognized Iraq's inability to maintain support and supply means over even moderate distances against concerted campaigns of interdiction by even the most basic means.
His analysis of the threats posed by North Korea and Iran, however, are the most telling. He lumped Lybia in with this as well, being THE most obvious example of a rogue dictator that the mid-80's could produce (ala Muammar al-Gaddafi), but couldn't be expected to know just how effective the retaliation strikes Reagan was yet to smack-down on Tripoli would be.
North Korea's habit of pushing the "West" to the point of intervention, then backing down when given some money/aid/technology/trade status as a consolation prize was detailed in these pages as far back as my high school years, and have proven true in the 25 years since. So has Iran's ability to influence violence and instability throughout the region by sending as many imams into its neighbors hands as it has sent weapons, munitions, and money into the hands of its neighbor's enemies.
Another surprising piece of this work was his analysis of the problems facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Aside from history's more obvious lessons (Saddam, Iran, and bin Laden), he talks at length about Yemen. In the years the book was written, there were two Yemen's, one of which waged a 7-day shooting "war" with the Saudi Army in '83 that had no discernible results other than the dead soldiers it produced. However, relations with the Yemen people (regardless of politics within Yemen) has not improved one iota. There are more than one million Yemeni men working the oil fields of the Arabian peninsula today, and all are treated worse than second-class citizens. They are forced to live in separated, isolated communities with little to no contact with Saudi nationals. Their communications with family back in Yemen are restricted and closely monitored, as is their ability to travel. Everything the Saudis accuse Israel of in regards to the "inhuman treatment of Palestinians" they are just as guilty of with the people they bring in to work their oil wells and processing plants from Yemen.
This situation has, just in the last few days, grown from a smolder to a flame in Arabia Felix. We can now read about shots exchanged across the border, insurrection and violence within the Yemeni community inside the kingdom, and a build up of forces to address the "problem" on both sides.
The most telling example of Dr. Dunnigan's insight is with the Russians, however...
He was writing about the Soviet Union, but throughout his writing, he routinely refers to them as "Russians", and explains himself as doing this because the elite ruling-class that controlled every aspect of political and diplomatic (and military) activity and goals in the USSR were exclusively RUSSIAN and maintained an exclusively RUSSIAN advantage in all their stated goals. Nothing the Politburo did was ever exclusively for the benefit of ethnic Ukranians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians (even Stalin didn't trust Georgians!), Armenians, or any one of the other 180 "ethnic" peoples of the former USSR.
The goals he outlines in his work as being the goals of "Russia" can still be seen today as the goals of modern, post-Soviet Moscow. They are STILL working to build a greater influence in economics, politics, and military ventures across the globe. They are firming up their claims on regional, even extra-territorial, resources (ala the planting of Russian "flags" under the polar ice caps) while at the same time building on their ability to provide those resources to hungry (even starving!) markets across Euroasia. They also have the largest stockpile of fissionable material (whether in bombs or not) on the face of the earth... much of which is not satisfactorily accounted for, either.
More importantly, the PROBLEMS that the USSR faced in 1985 in regards to increasing unrest and growing populations within the "Soviet" Muslim demographic are no longer "theirs"... they are the world's. The instability inherent in such regimes as Khazikstan, Azherbijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, and (the most glaring example) the Chechnyan region of Russia are no longer the SOLE responsibility of Moscow, but are now the SHARED threat of the entire globe.
An eye-opening read, I can tell you.
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3 comments:
1 point, 1 question:
First, any "lessons" on Russia's experience with Afghanistan are worthy of US attention, but I'm particularly interested in them in relation to Pakistan. It is becoming evident that a real unknown in the equation of our success there is Pakistan - the border has proven insecurable (either lack of resources or will or both on the part of the Paks); and the seccular (quasi anyway) government has the potential to fall to radicals, radicals that would then have access to nuclear wepons.
Secondly - did he predict the fall of the Soviet Empire? In specific terms I mean, as in the Dr.'s lifetime, a decade, etc? And if so, why were you so thoroughly convinced it would not at the time? And look, you're in good company if you'll pardon the pun, the CIA up to when the first brick fell in Berlin was of your same mind.
Just some thoughts on your find there ...
Oh, & a third - were there any suggestions as how to "break" the North Korean cycle of "to the brink", then a back off? Seriously, if they KNOW they have an adversary that's a serial bluffer, why would they stop? Again, just a thought.
No, he didn't predict the fall of the USSR (at least not by 1999), but he did feel that a direct conflict between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in central Europe was the least likely manner in which a fight between the (then) superpowers would BEGIN. He felt (as I did) that maintaining the "status quo" in Europe was more important than minor political gains that might or might not be made in the long term through short term "hard ball" diplomatic actions (very much like those taken by Reagan in his second term).
No, he was no more a seer than anyone else, but his analysis was cutting and quite deep... all the more true if it still holds up after 25 years!
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