Wednesday, April 7, 2010

The new START treaty...

So, tomorrow, Obama and Medvedev are going to meet in Prague and sign the new START treaty, further reducing our deployed nuclear arsenal and our total number of delivery systems for the reduced number of warheads. Lots of radio and TV pundits are equating this treaty with the latest from the White House concerning the recently revisited definitions and limits on our stated nuclear response protocols... and this is what I wanted to comment on.

I have looked over every piece of information I can find on this treaty to be signed tomorrow, and while I haven't found a complete digital example of what the two leaders will be signing, the first two pages of the treaty (containing the main text and the verification protocols) are available HERE. I have to say, in all honesty, that this is a treaty I can support.

This is NOT simply an extension of the existing '91 START agreement. It is a further reduction of deployed warheads and existing nuclear delivery platforms (meaning missiles), with the total number being reduced to 1,550 for each nation.

Here's what I like about it:

1) No limits or even mention of development and deployment of anti-missile defense systems, which was something Russia has insisted on for nearly a decade.

2) No limit on where "non-deployed" (meaning stockpiled) warheads can be stored. This means that existing treaty agreements with European and Asian allies where we are allowed to cache warheads in secure bunkers DO NOT count towards our deployed arsenal total. This is a plus for us on numerous levels... we HAVE existing stockpiles outside of the US (Germany, South Korea, Diego Garcia, and the UK), while the only places that the Russians can keep spare warheads is within its current territorial borders. All other former Soviet republics have agreed to relinquish Soviet weapons to the Russians as long as they are off their soil (Byelorussia, Moldovia, Lithuania, Khazakstan), and no current provisions exist for the forward storage of those warheads. Admittedly, the Russian footprint on the global map is much bigger than ours, but the more they have to spread their silos and launchers to the arctic regions, the more it is going to cost them in maintenance and construction. Our facilities are functional and in-place.

3) The treaty requires only that existing silo launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have their warheads removed to constitute compliance under the treaty. The missiles themselves need not be removed or otherwise altered. If the need should arrise, our far superior numbers of SLBMs could be made operational simply by replacing the warheads from existing stockpiles of cached warheads... a process that would take less than 7 days to complete for any given number of existing SLBMs.

4) The treaty counts strategic bomber warheads as "one per bomber" and ICBM warheads as "one per missile". This gives the US a huge advantage over the Russians, as we have vastly superior capability to employ MIRV and cruise missile weapons than the Russians do. Verification and compliance will only require that deployed bombers and ICBMs (on boomers, for example) count as ONE WARHEAD, even if the bomber or ICBM actually has multiple warheads ready to be scrambled. I know, the Russians have this capacity, too... but ours is known to be better by a ratio of nearly 4 to 1.

Honestly, I can bitch and complain about a lot of foreign policy coming out of the Obama White House... but this treaty doesn't appear to be one of them. Honestly, I can't entirely understand why Medvedev/Putin are agreeing to it. Seems they could play a little more of the hard-ball, and hope for more concessions from Obama... but what the hell?

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