In the years after World War II, Japan's relations with the United States were placed on an equal footing for the first time at the end of the occupation by the Allied forces in April 1952. This equality, the legal basis of which was laid down in the peace treaty signed by forty-eight Allied nations and Japan, was initially largely nominal, because in the early postoccupation period Japan required direct United States economic assistance. A favorable Japanese balance of payments with the United States was achieved in 1954, mainly as a result of United States military and aid spending in Japan.
The Japanese people's feeling of dependence lessened gradually as the disastrous results of World War II subsided into the background and trade with the United States expanded. Self-confidence grew as the country applied its resources and organizational skill to regaining economic health. This situation gave rise to a general desire for greater independence from United States influence. During the 1950s and 1960s, this feeling was especially evident in the Japanese attitude toward United States military bases on the four main islands of Japan and in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying the southern two-thirds of the Ryukyu Islands.
The government had to balance left-wing pressure advocating dissociation from the United States against the realities of the need for military protection. Recognizing the popular desire for the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Bonin Islands (also known as the Ogasawara Islands), the United States as early as 1953 voluntarily relinquished its control of the Amami group of islands at the northern end of the Ryukyu Islands. But the United States made no commitment to return Okinawa, which was then under United States military administration for an indefinite period as provided in Article 3 of the peace treaty. Popular agitation culminated in a unanimous resolution adopted by the Diet in June 1956, calling for a return of Okinawa to Japan.
Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact began in 1959, and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960. When the pact was submitted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it became the subject of bitter debate over the Japan-United States relationship and the occasion for violence in an all-out effort by the leftist opposition to prevent its passage. It was finally approved by the House of Representatives on May 20. Japan Socialist Party deputies boycotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the LDP deputies from entering the chamber; they were forcibly removed by the police. Massive demonstrations and rioting by students and trade unions followed. These outbursts prevented a scheduled visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not before the treaty was passed by default on June 19, when the House of Councillors failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days after lower house approval.
Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration. (It was understood, however, that Japan could not come to the defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces overseas. In particular, the constitution forbids the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces." It also expresses the Japanese people's renunciation of "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes". Accordingly, the Japanese find it difficult to send their "self-defense" forces overseas, even for peace-keeping purposes.) The scope of the new treaty did not extend to the Ryukyu Islands, but an appended minute made clear that in case of an armed attack on the islands, both governments would consult and take appropriate action. Notes accompanying the treaty provided for prior consultation between the two governments before any major change occurred in the deployment of United States troops or equipment in Japan. Unlike the 1952 security pact, the new treaty provided for a ten-year term, after which it could be revoked upon one year's notice by either party. The treaty included general provisions on the further development of international cooperation and on improved future economic cooperation.
Both countries worked closely to fulfill the United States promise, under Article 3 of the peace treaty, to return all Japanese territories acquired by the United States in war. In June 1968 the United States returned the Bonin Islands (including Iwo Jima) to Japanese administration control. In 1969 the Okinawa reversion issue and Japan's security ties with the United States became the focal points of partisan political campaigns. The situation calmed considerably when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku visited Washington in November 1969, and in a joint communiqué signed by him and President Richard M. Nixon, announced the United States agreement to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In June 1971, after eighteen months of negotiations, the two countries signed an agreement providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972.
The Japanese government's firm and voluntary endorsement of the security treaty and the settlement of the Okinawa reversion question meant that, two major political issues in Japan-United States relations were eliminated.
If you'll allow my translation ... in the 1952 Treaty (when MacArthur's boys turned over the government to the Japanese) we promised to "address" the issue of returning the captured WWII lands "at some point" in the future. Between 1952 and 1959 the political situation within Japan arose whereas the Japanese began clamoring for "all lands" to be returned. On the one hand political parties within Japan were calling for complete autonomy where more practical parties knew complete separation from the US was not possible for a myriad of reasons both economic and national security (after all, China & the USSR were quite cozy). Well, in 1959 the US decided the internal Japanese request of land return had hit critical mass - the calls for a return of "certain islands" could no longer be ignored given Japan was too important strategically in light of the Cold War, as well as its' growing importance economically. So in 1960 we signed "The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security." And even THEN there wasn't specific language as to a date that Iwo Jima would be returned, but under Article 3 it was noted that such returns should be "addressed and effected." Combined with the fact that there was a clause noting that the new Treaty was only good for 10 years at which point either party could pull out with 1 year notice, a clear window for various island returns had been set. Yet, with that pull out clause another "out" was given the US if they felt it detrimental to hand over Iwo Jima (part of the strategically important chain of Bonin Islands) - a clearly smart move on our part.
Well, by 1968 those Japanese voices crying for Japan's autonomy back in 59' became white hot. Washington decided the time had come. They needed Japan as a willing ally during the Cold War and as an economic partner. We would give back the Bonin Chain, but not before air bases (this is where the conspiracies are inserted) and the storage of nuclear weapons under US control were agreed to by the Japanese.
So, we gave it back. We subsequently gave back control of Okinawa in 1972. And I must say it was a logical progression. We got the best of both worlds - we kept complete control of strategic Pacific Islands as Japan developed both as a democratic/free market AND our staunch ally, then when we finally gave it back it was seen as PR "friendly" to the Japanese citizen, all while we maintained a permanent military presence in each site as part of the deal. It was the text book US economic-foreign policy of the time ... of course that was back when adults ran the show.
I hope that proved enlightening. It was for me ... and as often is the case, I have a child to thank.
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