The "Three State Plan"

It is a shockingly beautiful, crisp cool day here in NEPA, and after a first obligatory cup of coffee and a smoke while the dog relieves himself in the yard, I sat down to view the latest news available via the World Wide Web.

The headline that caught my eye was one concerning Senator Brownback’s bipartisan plan to draw up a “three state” solution to the crisis in Iraq. It seems that Brownback and Biden have revisited the plan wherein Iraq would be divided into three states of Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish majorities, each with its own elected central government and each with its own security and defense organizations to ensure peace, stability and sovereignty.

We in the Bund have discussed this topic on numerous occasions and have had mixed results (if memory serves). I would make my argument here, as clearly and succinctly as I can.

Aside from the obvious question of “viability of policy” (let’s be honest… we haven’t done such a good job getting ONE Iraq up and running, so how well will we manage getting THREE of them functioning in the same timeframe?) there are two main themes to consider in this question: an historical perspective of past attempts at nation-building and an objective look at what has worked and not worked in Iraq to date.

In 2003, Toby Dodge wrote “Inventing Iraq”, which I feel is an excellent source for data in my argument (he cites over 100 different works in his research, and it is well written), in which he compares the British mandate for Iraq of 1921 (when Faisal was installed as King) to the Coalition’s efforts to date in Iraq now.

In 1920-21, the British needed to focus control of the country on domestic Iraqi elements instead of British Foreign Office appointees, and they chose (arbitrarily, in my opinion) to focus that control on a tribal, ethnic level while giving governmental power and authority to an ethnic foreigner in Faisal I, a Hashemite ruler from Damascus in Syria (then controlled by France). In a very short time, agrarian land ownership was dominated by a vast Sunni middle class, while the Shi’a, Christian and Kurdish populations were marginalized. In short, they focused on the ethnicity issue as a delineator of control and authority in setting up the “new” Iraq of 1921.

My comparison to today’s issues is this: Haven’t we done the same thing in focusing our attention so much on tribal and religious leaders who “claim” to gain authority by popular assent from their respective ethnic or religious constituencies? The factions of power in today’s Iraq focus on Shi’a religious leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr and the Kurdish ethnic leader Massoud Barzani, among others. Coalition attention is focused, intentionally or otherwise, on this ethnic specificity as a matter of policy… as is the attention of neighboring states like Iran and Syria that might not have the best intentions of the Iraqi people at heart.

The British mandate formed the modern state of Iraq out of the confusion and chaos of post-WWI Mesopotamia with no regard for ethnic or religious boundaries, marking the beginning of a multi-cultural and ethnically diverse state. Right or wrong, the job there was done for us 88 years ago. That forced multi-cultural blending was long, bloody and still hasn’t finalized into a cohesive Iraqi nationality.

However, that process has nearly a century of progress behind it, and I am not sure it should be abandoned simply as an expedient way for the US (and especially two Senators with higher political aspirations in mind) to extricate itself from a bloody and expensive effort to bring democracy and freedom to 26 million people.

In the intervening 88 years, the Kurdish, Shi’a and Sunni populations have intermarried or relocated to homes outside of their traditional ethnic origin, while religious and lingual differences (even within the varied groups) have not diminished. For example, I have recently read that the various Kurdish dialects spoken in what is often referred to as “Kurdistan” are mutually unintelligible, and I have no knowledge of an “ecumenical” movement within the Shi’a-Sunni sects… yet circumstances and various governmental policies in the intervening years have brought Kurds to Baghdad and Shi’as to the Sunni “Triangle” of influence by the hundreds of thousands.

My question is this: What sense is there in following the course of failed historical policy in regards to Iraq? None, but the situation in Iraq is no longer as ethnically or religiously divided as it was in the 1920’s. The region is replete with examples of ethnically diverse nations… Israel, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria…that function at least as well (if not leaps and bounds above) the post-invasion Iraq does now. I do not feel it is a good idea to bring more division to the region, when we can focus our efforts on making the diverse cultures of Iraq function as a society instead.

Finally, I can’t help but think that the example of the British is further useful to us in that it shows two extremely important lessons:

1) The superiority of arms and technology is not enough to maintain order and security in Iraq without substantial “domestic” influence and participation. This is something the US is following as a matter of course in putting so much attention of the development and training of the ISF and Iraqi Army, but that the media and the world in general is not taking into account.

2) The possible establishment of “arbitrary” boundaries and borders amidst the cultures and religious sects in modern Iraq will not eliminate or even reduce the occurrence of violence in the region, and instead will undoubtedly cause them to increase. To displace, by force or necessity, huge segments of the population from one place to another based only on ethnic or religious affiliation is a recipe for conflict that no one with a drop of common sense could refute. To back this kind of policy simply because it gives the US troops and interests shorter “tour” in Iraq is nearly criminal in its negligent attitude.

Just my thoughts…

T