Okay, but...

Even if we look at the period of Doolittle's command of the Eighth AAF as the start of the campaign to draw out the German fighters, we can't ignore the fact that "strategic bombing" had been an established strategy of the Allies for at least a full year prior.

So, I'm asking you... What was Doolittle's primary duty (if not immediate goal)? Destroy or impede German infrastructure and morale through overwhelming application of Allied strategic bombing efforts (the textbook definition of "strategic bombing in WWII"), or "to impose heavy losses on German day fighter force and to conserve German fighter force away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war" , as established in the Casablanca Directive of Jan '43? Both ends were served, and both goals met. I understand that questions exist about the means by which those goals were met... but "strategic bombing" of the sort we are discussing was all but unheard of prior to the outbreak of WWII, so alternatives were not only unknown but unknowable. Basically, the Allies had only the experiences of the British during the Blitz to measure cause and effect by... and those effects were not in favor of the effort anyway (since British morale wasn't impeded by German bombing they way Hitler had hoped it would be).

Are we "mad" at the mainstream view of history that has ignored the Casablanca Directive for the better part of 60 years? Who are we mad at? Surely, not Doolittle... right?