The Classics

Ahhh, the classics ... symmetrical warfare. Enemies with fixed borders and identifiable realestate. A time when men with big chests and cold glares could sit among the frozen tundra, icy spit stuck to their wayward beards, and move Risk pieces around on a board that meant something. Whom among us doesn't pine for such "cave-free" days?

Now to get to it - I must concur with Jambo. I don't see how in retrospect we can all agree that the Soviet's unsustainability as an Empire meant losing the Cold War was a forgone conclusion, yet not see their losing a hot war as a forgone conclusion (especially a protracted one). But more on that in a moment.

My 3 basic reasons, and conclusion.

1.) From what I gather you've noted that Soviet "blitzkrieg" was a neccessity to victory, and would focus around avoiding urban choke points. And my point in this instance is the Soviets have 2 choices in their march forward, both bad. If they are to focus their "punching through" via routes of sparsely populated, rural territory then they would be open to the full weight and might of our superior air power. The only way to avoid such merciless strafing would of course be to prey upon the West's inability (post Vietnam) to stomach mass civilian casualties. In other words they mitigate the carpet bombing by heading to/through those urban areas. In which case you have a determined resistance, defending every square inch of their home territory. This is a lesson the victors of Stalingrad and veterans of Afghanistan would not take lightly. In either case I don't see any "obvious" potential for the dreaded "punch through."

2.) You (Titus) seem to focus much of your angst over the ability of NATO to maintain its cohesiveness. And as exhibit A you note the penchant of France, Spain, Italy et al for finding a way, any way, to weasel out of their NATO obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan (& Libya, etc). I don't think that's an apples to apples comparison, and here's why: there are still legitimate arguments being had (& I fall on the war approach side) on whether the "war on terror" is properly handled as a "war", or should be seen as a police/law enforcement action. Also, the necessity of Iraq, of staying in Afghanistan, America's "war of choices", these are all a part of the domestic discussion in Continental Europe, and have been for 10 years. And I am willing to wager that those same weasels at the lectern would start quoting chapter and verse from the pulpit regarding NATO's "attack on one" policy were it the Red Army barreling into Western Germany with the intent of not stopping until they had replaced Hadrian's Wall with the Iron Curtain. In addition, much of the bravado parylization of Western Europe stems from Political Correctness. This has choked off rationale discussion on how we must deal with Radical Islam (when they'll even mention the words "Islam" and "problem" in the same breath, that is). I don't see such a problem with ethnic Russians within Europe. If for no other reason then ethnic Russians are less likely to form a political PAC and become professional victims.

3.) We mustn't forget that any NATO coalition engaged in repelling a Soviet invasion of Western Germany (forward), would be helmed by a Reagan-Thatcher alliance. There is no measure to how much effort, productivity, and commitment to total war these 2 would muster in this struggle. This matters. Especially for an Soviet Empire (circa the 1980's) whom knew it was but a few fiscal cycles away from internal collapse (this point does in no way negate the necessity/fortitude of the Reagan foot-on-throat confrontation policy as a means of speeding up this decline).

In conclusion ...

"Look, like I said, I'm not saying we couldn't have won a third European war. In fact, I am convinced we would have. I'm simply saying that it isn't the forgone conclusion that many seem to think it is."

I suppose it is this line which puzzles me most of all. I'm not sure I understand it. Isn't stating "I am convinced we would have (won)" the textbook definition of a "forgone conclusion?"

If you mean to say it wouldn't have been as "easy" as many think it would have been, I don't follow there either. I don't think anyone from Eisenhower, to Reagan to the producers of Red Dawn thought it would be "easy" to beat the Reds. They were a Super Power after all. Just inevitable.

At any rate, I would just suggest we ask what the Soviets themselves thought was a "forgone conclusion", or at least what we can gleam about it via their actions. Consider the case of West Berlin. Soon after WWII when they attempted to blockade that half of the city, effectively starve it out, they failed, miserably. This with much of the Red Army still parked near the steps of the Reichstag no less. Either they hadn't the ability, or the will (or both), to stop a simple airlift drop to half of a city within a territory they completely controlled. And what's more, despite their control of East Germany, from 1945-1991 they never attempted (overtly anyway) to retake that half of the city. In fact, save Cuba, (which they backed down from) all of their expansionist aims were directed East. I can only assume that while you may not think their defeat in a war with the West was a forgone conclusion, the Soviet hierarchy, did.

Just my thoughts anyway ... feel free to disagree.