I wrote:
"You seem to focus much of your angst over the (in)ability of NATO to maintain its cohesiveness. And as exhibit A you note the penchant of France, Spain, Italy et al for finding a way, any way, to weasel out of their NATO obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan (& Libya, etc). I don't think that's an apples to apples comparison ... I am willing to wager that those same weasels at the lectern would start quoting chapter and verse from the pulpit regarding NATO's "attack on one" policy were it the Red Army barreling into Western Germany with the intent of not stopping until they had replaced Hadrian's Wall with the Iron Curtain."
Look, far be it from me to defend the pristine nature of these multilateral institutions, and I mean that sincerely. But with a Russian invasion there aren't any of the usual squirming, weak knee issues that send European elites running to a microphone intent on exercising their favorite past time just ahead of Cricket - bashing America for domestic consumption. No minority voting blocks to offend, no PC, no "America's wars of choice." The aggressor and what is at stake would be crystal clear, even to modern European leaders.
Let's put it this way, and this is relevant to the time frame we're discussing, as it occurred in 1991. The most impressive display of NATO "plus" coalition building in recent history was the first Gulf War. President George H. Bush put together a monumental group (something on the order of 90 countries if I remember correctly), with NATO (via America) at the lead. And this was all made capable because the conflict wasn't murky, wasn't debatable. The aggressor was clear. If the world can come together, and in this case NATO, with a rapid, no holds barred agreement to eject Saddam out of Kuwait, then I can't see how that arrangement doesn't play out ten fold if instead of a tiny Arab country the ally being invaded is West Germany, leading into Holland, France and Italy.
Do you see my point? If we can rapidly come together with Europe to defend Kuwait, then I assume we can rapidly come together with Europe to defend Europe.
And one more aspect we should consider. And this is certainly an angle with ramifications in the long term of any war with the Soviets, not the initial 24-48 hours. The peoples of Europe tend to dispatch with the ineffectiveness of "dovish" leadership once the war is "on." Now they are just as apt to discard their wartime leadership once peace is secured, but your presumption on a faulty NATO alliance is based on the assumption that the doves you haven't any faith in, would remain in power for long. I don't think they would, less they immediately go from Chamberlain to Churchill in their posturing.
Sunday, December 19, 2010
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