I was hanging plastic over our drafty, century-old sash windows today (in an almost hopeless effort to keep some of the drafts at bay) and had ample time to ponder my previous post.
There are several scenarios that are used in my references that give the advance of Soviet forces into the West at as far as the Weser River at Hameln by the end of the second day's fighting (48 hours). This is a staggering amount of ground given up to the Soviets, but the reasoning isn't inferior NATO equipment or tactics, or even superior tactics or numbers on the part of the Soviets. It is the inability of CENTAG units (mainly German, British and Netherland divisions) to mobilize and coordinate fast enough to counter the speed with which the Soviets moved over ground in the first hours of the fighting (exactly as their doctrines called for... modern blitzkrieg). In the NORTHAG and SOUTHAG areas (where there were greater concentrations of US and British divisions), these same scenarios don't show the rapid advances that the CENTAG area shows.
Without saying as much, I think this is because it was understood that the US and British divisions in Germany would hold ground better than any other divisions... including the Germans. It was a given fact that the Bundeswehr would fight tooth-and-nail for every inch of ground... but I think it was also understood that this strategy provided for as many obstacles as it did up-sides. Both the Soviets and the US/British fully understood the value in giving some ground in favor of that which can be better defended (the Sovs learned that lesson from the Germans themselves in 1941-42... the Americans and Brits during Market Garden in 1944). In other words, the US might allow a 10 km advance that took the Soviets 24 hours to achieve at great cost... but by trying to stop the Soviets immediately, a breakout was probable that would open the rear to Soviet armor and allow for a far greater gain at less cost over a shorter period of time.
Another factor that I am not sure was ever adequately covered in the more famous "novels" on the topic was that of civilians. An invasion of West Germany by the Soviets would have forced the evacuation of no fewer than 1.4 million people from their homes, over an area the size of the MS/LA state line. Even today, 30 years later, there are no adequate means to move that many people in even as much as five days, let alone as few as two or three. NATO units would have been forced to stop and defend areas where civilian casualties might be greatest, even if it meant loosing the strategic or tactical initiative (if it was ever held at all). NATO would no longer be allowed the luxury of dictating where and when they would choose to defend ground... the civilians and refugees would do that for them. Shockingly enough... I had always assumed that the Soviets would USE the roads, rails, canals and bridges as they moved west, but it seems that standard doctrines called for unit commanders in the farthest forward areas of the front to avoid them because of civilian traffic. It was assumed from the start that bridges and tunnels would, wherever possible, be destroyed to deny them use by the Soviets... so it was better for the Soviets to advance along axis' that avoided such choke points anyway. What better way to encircle and cut off NATO units than to force them to protect and defend civilians while the Soviets shoot past towards the rear on secondary routes or open ground?
Honestly... imagine a scene like the one we all remember from Katrina: Every major road and interstate running with traffic (including contra-flow traffic) away from the danger zone. Then add the necessity of moving millions of tons of equipment and tens of thousands of troops against this tide towards the danger zone. How does that work to the advantage of the NATO troops and commanders?
Well... just more musings.
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2 comments:
At the very least, Jambo will recall that one of Clancy's primary sources in Red Storm Rising made the point that losses to armor and infantry vehicles due to light, fast anti-tank weapons like the Javelin and TOW systems cost the Soviets dearly during the opening days of the war.
The case has been made now that there were almost NO anti-tank ammunition that would penetrate the ERA shielding on the T-72 and T-80 MBTs. Without that initial ability to stall or halt armored units as they advance, the timeline of the actual "war" changes remarkably.
"Red Army" is a Soviet wank with a political agenda behind it. Ralph Peters wanted to lambast NATO as the talking club it had, in his eyes, become. And he didn't seem to have a very high opinion of Germans in general and the German Army in particular, either...which would show itself again several years later...
IIRC, he told Americans not to buy German products anymore after Chancellor Schröder (rightly so, but for all the wrong reasons) in 2003 declined German participation in the invasion of Iraq. Am I the only one who got reminded of "Deutsche, kauft nicht bei Juden"?
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