Wednesday, June 23, 2010

An update on the German question(s) ...

1.) It wasn't Goring ...

Goring was fledgling in his assault on England, he wasted far too many planes on sites other than the RAF bases which should had been his target if Germany was to lay the groundwork for Operation Sea Lion (the ground forces invasion of the British Isles). Between Hitler's growing frustration with the inability to quickly dominate the skies for his upcoming British invasion and the Brit's moxy bombing of Berlin (morale more than strategic, like Doolittle), he ordered the bombing of London and subsequent cities. His theory was either the common people would be so rattled they'd demand a government who would sue for (a puppet-regime style) peace (which is what he wanted so as to get on with Russia and destroying Bolshevism); or their morale so depleted as to make Sea Lion a walk.

2.) Upon further reflection this all strikes me as a bit mute - invading Russia was the war as far as Hitler was concerned, just as much as dominating Europe. Gaining "breathing room" in the East was as much a part of his war aims as dominating the West. We can say he "lost the war" by going into Russia, but that's not entirely accurate. More accurate, I think - as I work through this thought process here (forgive me) - is pinning Germany's Achilles heel on Hitler's impatience born of an inflated belief of his own military prowess after the WWI victor, France, hit the dirt like a hill billy prom dress. Just follow me here. If he first goes after Poland, then France, then Britain, then the US via Japanese and German forces combined, saving Russia for last (assuming Ol' Joey Staleen laughs as both the Brits and the US fall at the hands of his "pal" Adolph), then there exists the potential for a different outcome. In essence the timing of his various invasions (which came unraveled after he fails to take Britain in 1940, his first loss) is the culprit more so then the particular countries he chose to invade. He could have focused on Western Europe, prevented Japan from hitting Pearl, then go after the US knowing Stalin would cheerlead, and then go into Russia - preferably at the beginning of summer. Hitler's timing due to ego and belief in his own abilities prevented such a methodical, deliberated approach. In 1939, even into 41', his armies could of wiped the floor with the UK or Russia. He would have been wise to play them off of each other to the demise of each - defeating one then the other rather then force them into bedfellows aligned against him.

It works the other way too ... hit Russia first (then France & the UK). Chamberlain would have done nothing at a German invasion of Russia, and it's unlikely Churchill rallies the nation to defend Stalin's Soviet's, a man and government he despised nearly as much as National Socialism. In that scenario Hitler saves the US for last, and now he has the oil rich Urals to fuel his war machine. The combinations for success were he to go one at a time with these uneasy allies, rather then uniting them with simultaneous theaters of combat, are endless.

At any rate, MY POINT is Germany's undoing is the timing of Hitler's invasions. Going after Russia before the UK submits (or vice versa). Then allowing the US to come in (signing off on Japan's attack on Pearl) before Russia submits. He kept expecting the success in Poland & France to follow in Britain and Russia, and didn't wait for the outcomes to be sure before launching on the next invasion. He wanted Germany to rule the world for a 1000 years, but he wanted to get there in 2.

(* By the way: I stress "potential for a different outcome" because I do believe in the inevitability of American exceptionalism defeating Nazi Germany, no matter the circumstance. However, that is a bias - one I proudly submit - and not necessarily an objective dissertation on where Hitler went wrong.)

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